FTI Investigations / Aviation & government contracts
Who Controls America's Skies?
A nationwide flight shutdown, an ambitious rebuilding project, a proposal to restructure the FAA, and the private companies involved. What the documents show—and what they do not.
On November 13, thousands of Americans found their flights stopped because a communications problem had spread through the nation's air traffic control system. The immediate problem was serious. The larger questions reach into years of aging equipment, a multibillion-dollar modernization program, a federal procurement overhaul and proposals laid out in Project 2025. Understanding the connections requires separating three things: what happened, what the administration has changed and what Project 2025 still proposes to change.
First, what happened to the flights?
On Friday, November 13, 2026, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued a nationwide ground stop after telecommunications trouble affected air traffic controllers' communications and radar information. A ground stop prevents departing aircraft from taking off while officials evaluate safety conditions. It does not mean every plane already in the sky suddenly stops flying. The order lasted more than four hours, and disruptions continued after departures resumed. The FAA described its first statement as preliminary. [1]
At a November 14 briefing, Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy said a contractor was replacing old copper connections with fiber-optic equipment at a remote FAA site. The contractor was L3Harris, a longstanding telecommunications provider to the agency. A November 15 FAA update identified two possible trouble locations: a radar site in Amarillo, Texas, and a radio communications site in El Dorado, Arkansas, where L3Harris had been installing a new router. The FAA said a flood of network connection attempts disrupted some communications and radar data; not all communications were lost. Officials were still investigating whether the fault was in equipment or installation. [2] [13]
That distinction matters: officials identified a likely technical chain of events, but they had not reached a final determination of fault. The November 13 incident is not evidence by itself that Project 2025 caused the outage, that modernization caused the entire problem, or that any contractor deliberately disrupted aviation.
In everyday terms: Imagine a major highway whose traffic lights, cameras and emergency radios depend on a shared communications network. Even if the highway itself is sound, one network malfunction can force officials to slow or stop traffic until they know it is safe. Air traffic control depends on many interconnected systems on a much larger scale.
Why is America's air traffic technology so old?
The problem predates this administration. In a 2024 review, the nonpartisan Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that the FAA had classified 51 of its 138 air traffic control systems as unsustainable and another 54 as potentially unsustainable. In plain language, many critical systems were difficult to maintain or replace and could be vulnerable to failures or shortages of parts. [3]
Controllers need reliable radios, computer displays, radar, weather equipment and connections between facilities. Some older systems rely on technology designed decades ago. The FAA has tried to modernize them under several administrations, but large projects can become expensive, slow and difficult to coordinate. Replacing the equipment is a genuine public-safety need, not a proposal unique to Project 2025.
Where Project 2025 enters the picture
Project 2025 is a policy blueprint developed by the Heritage Foundation and participating conservative organizations before the 2024 election. Its transportation chapter was written by Diana Furchtgott-Roth, a former senior Transportation Department official. The chapter includes a section specifically about the FAA on pages 632–634. [4]
The chapter argues that the FAA combines two very different jobs. One is regulating aviation safety—setting standards, inspecting and certifying. The other is operating air traffic services—helping guide flights safely through national airspace. It proposes separating those jobs more sharply.
Among its principal recommendations are:
- Separating the FAA from the Department of Transportation or, at minimum, separating the FAA's Air Traffic Organization (ATO) from the rest of the agency.
- Changing how air traffic services are funded so they depend less on annual congressional appropriations.
- Making FAA operations and purchasing practices more businesslike.
- Considering direct fees paid to an independent ATO, instead of the existing system of aviation user taxes.
- Allowing that organization to finance major projects through long-term revenue bonds.
- Reducing FAA research-and-development work and placing more emphasis on evaluating and certifying private-sector technology.
The chapter explicitly says that the three major structural changes—separating the ATO, replacing taxes with fees and issuing revenue bonds—would require legislation. In other words, describing those proposals is not the same as saying they have already become law. [4]
Project 2025 does not need to be the original source of every aviation reform for its recommendations to be worth examining. Proposals to separate or privatize parts of air traffic control existed long before 2025. Furchtgott-Roth also publicly advocated a private or public-private approach in a December 2025 Heritage Foundation commentary. That shows the policy proposal remained active; it does not prove a particular government contract was awarded to implement that proposal. [5]
What has actually changed at the FAA?
In January 2026, Secretary Duffy and FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford announced an agency reorganization. It included an Airspace Modernization Office to direct the installation of new air traffic systems, a consolidated safety-management structure and an office focused on advanced aviation technology. The Air Traffic Organization remained within the FAA. [6]
There is another important historical detail: Congress had already called for an Airspace Modernization Office in the bipartisan FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024, before the current administration took office. Therefore, this office cannot accurately be described as something Project 2025 alone created.
| What Project 2025 proposed | What is documented by November 2026 |
|---|---|
| Separate air traffic operations from the FAA | Not implemented; the Air Traffic Organization remains at the FAA. |
| Rely less on annual federal funding | Not implemented as proposed; Congress continues to appropriate modernization funding. |
| Replace aviation taxes with direct user fees and allow bonds | No verified enactment of these structural proposals. |
| Use more businesslike acquisition procedures | The FAA did adopt accelerated procurement rules for the modernization program. |
| Modernize aviation technology more quickly | A large modernization effort is underway, although the need and several component projects predated 2025. |
The procurement decision that deserves attention
In August 2025, according to a September 2026 GAO report, the FAA administrator placed the modernization programs under accelerated purchasing rules and issued a broad waiver. Under it, the programs were exempt from nearly all requirements of the FAA's normal Acquisition Management System. The FAA substituted a shorter set of principles intended to speed decisions while maintaining transparency, accountability and fiscal responsibility. [7]
What is procurement? It is the process government agencies use to buy goods and services with public money: deciding what to buy, comparing bids, checking costs, documenting approvals and monitoring contractors.
Speeding up procurement can help replace unreliable equipment sooner. Fewer standard review steps can also make independent cost and schedule oversight more important. The fact of a waiver does not, on its own, establish favoritism or illegal contracting.
This change resembles Project 2025's call for more businesslike FAA acquisition practices. But resemblance is not proof of a direct instruction chain. The evidence does not yet establish that the FAA issued the waiver because Project 2025 directed it to.
Who is Peraton, and what is it doing?
In December 2025, the FAA selected Peraton as the prime systems integrator for its Brand New Air Traffic Control System initiative. The job is to coordinate and integrate multiple modernization projects, rather than simply manufacture one piece of equipment. The FAA said it conducted a competitive procurement. [8]
Peraton is a government technology and defense contractor owned by private-equity firm Veritas Capital. Peraton announced its ownership connection when it appointed Steve Schorer as chief executive in 2024. The ownership relationship is public information, not an allegation. [9]
GAO reported a $1.5 billion contract ceiling and an approximately $876 million final negotiated price for Peraton's integrator work. The ceiling is the upper contract limit, not a sum necessarily spent. According to the FAA, existing contracts were modified so that Peraton could manage other participating contractors on the FAA's behalf. That is an important delegation of project-coordination responsibility; it is not the transfer of federal aviation regulation or ultimate public-safety authority to Peraton. [7]
Federal officials said the integrator would be judged on performance, schedules, costs and results. Senior FAA and Transportation Department officials retained an executive oversight committee. The central public question is whether that oversight is strong enough for a project with so many moving parts. [10]
What did the government's watchdog find?
GAO's September 14, 2026 report supported the need to modernize but warned that the program had moved forward without a reliable overall lifecycle cost estimate or a fully integrated master schedule. A lifecycle estimate counts the costs of buying, operating, maintaining and eventually replacing a system—not just the initial equipment bill. An integrated schedule makes sure thousands of related tasks happen in the right order. [7]
As of the period GAO examined, the FAA had 11,389 individual project schedules that were not fully integrated. That could mean technicians visit the same facility at separate times without coordinating necessary work, creating avoidable disruptions. The FAA said it was developing an AI-assisted tool to detect conflicts. The Transportation Department partially disagreed with GAO, arguing that scheduling and financial tools were improving. GAO maintained that the overall schedule and cost documentation still fell short of best practices.
This was a documented planning and oversight risk, not a finding that Peraton caused the November 13 outage. The report preceded that event by two months.
Peraton and L3Harris: two different roles
It would be a mistake to treat every company named in this story as if it held the same contract. Peraton was selected in late 2025 to coordinate modernization programs. L3Harris has been a longstanding provider of FAA telecommunications infrastructure. In the November 14 briefing, Secretary Duffy identified L3Harris as the contractor performing the copper-to-fiber work associated with the suspected router problem. [2]
The evidence available for this report does not establish whether Peraton directed that particular maintenance operation or had operational control of the affected legacy network. L3Harris said on November 14 that it was cooperating with FAA investigators and that it and its partners had completed more than 70 percent of the planned copper-to-fiber conversion. It would be incorrect to assume that a new prime integrator was responsible for all older FAA contracts or to claim that Project 2025 produced the outage. Determining contractual responsibility requires the actual task orders, maintenance records and incident investigation.
Follow the money: what has been funded, and what is only requested?
Congress appropriated $12.5 billion in July 2025 for aviation modernization, including about $9 billion for systems and $3.5 billion for facilities. An appropriation is money Congress has made available; it is not the same thing as money that has already been spent. GAO reported that, as of March 2026, the FAA had obligated about $1.8 billion of the systems allocation. [7]
On November 13, 2026, White House budget director Russell Vought and Secretary Sean Duffy asked Congress for another $30.1 billion. Reporting on the request described approximately $10.1 billion for further air traffic modernization, $2 billion for control towers and $18 billion for airport projects. After the ground stop, Duffy publicly advocated a larger figure of about $50 billion. That larger amount was a stated funding goal, not money Congress had approved. [11]
Vought is also the author of Project 2025's chapter on the Executive Office of the President. His role in the funding request is documented. It does not mean the request implements Project 2025's proposed user-fee system, which remains a different financing model requiring legislative action.
Supporters of additional funding argue that replacing obsolete technology sooner protects safety and reduces delays. Lawmakers questioning the request have asked for clearer accounting of existing appropriations and the complete cost of the work. Both questions are legitimate: Is the money needed, and can the public verify how it will be used?
What about the FAA administrator's ethics agreement?
There is a separate oversight issue involving Administrator Bedford, a former Republic Airways executive. The Office of Government Ethics notified Congress that he had failed to complete a promised divestiture of Republic holdings by the required October 2025 deadline. The Transportation Department later reported that he sold the shares in February 2026. In April, Senators Maria Cantwell, Tammy Duckworth and Edward Markey requested an inspector general investigation into whether the delay had been intentional and financially beneficial. Bedford has said he recused himself from matters directly affecting the company. [12]
The missed ethics commitment is documented; the senators' broader allegations require examination. There is no evidence established in the sources reviewed here that Republic stock transactions affected the Peraton award or the November ground stop. The matter belongs in this investigation as a distinct oversight thread, not as a proven contractor connection.
So, did Project 2025 take over the FAA?
That is not what the current records establish. They support a narrower, more useful conclusion:
- Established: Project 2025 explicitly recommends structural FAA changes, direct user fees, bond financing and more businesslike acquisition practices.
- Established: The administration reorganized parts of the FAA, accelerated modernization procurement and hired Peraton as an integrator.
- Established: GAO identified cost and schedule planning weaknesses. The November 13 ground stop followed a communications failure during work associated with L3Harris; the final technical and contractual findings are pending.
- Not established: That Project 2025 directly caused the procurement waiver, that its proposed organizational separation or financing system has been implemented, or that it caused the nationwide ground stop.
This distinction is the point of an evidence-based investigation. A proposal can resemble an agency action without being its proven cause. A company can hold a federal contract without evidence of wrongdoing. A major outage can expose a system's vulnerability without demonstrating a conspiracy.
What should Americans watch next?
Five records would provide meaningful answers. First, the FAA's actual August 2025 acquisition waiver and the rules it replaced. Second, Peraton's contract and modifications to contracts managed under the program, including which approvals must remain with federal officials. Third, a complete lifecycle cost estimate and a coordinated implementation schedule. Fourth, the FAA and Transportation Department's final November 13 incident investigation, including the L3Harris maintenance task orders. Fifth, any bill that would separate the Air Traffic Organization, replace existing aviation taxes with user fees, or authorize revenue bonds.
None of those questions requires assuming wrongdoing. They require following authority, decisions, contracts, money and evidence. That is what makes this investigation worth continuing.
Original documents and reporting
- FAA, statement on nationwide ground stop, November 13, 2026.
- U.S. Department of Transportation, Duffy/Bedford briefing, November 14, 2026.
- GAO, Air Traffic Control: FAA Actions Are Urgently Needed to Modernize Aging Systems, September 2024.
- Project 2025, Mandate for Leadership, Chapter 19, pp. 632–634.
- Diana Furchtgott-Roth, Heritage Foundation commentary, December 4, 2025.
- FAA, agency restructuring announcement, January 27, 2026.
- GAO, Air Traffic Control Systems: Ambitious New Modernization Effort Needs to Improve Cost and Schedule Planning, September 14, 2026.
- FAA, Peraton selection announcement, December 4, 2025.
- Peraton, ownership and chief executive announcement, September 3, 2024.
- DOT/FAA, Brand New Air Traffic Control System fact sheet, December 2025.
- Reuters, $30.1 billion budget request, November 13, 2026.
- U.S. Senate Commerce Committee minority, request for Bedford investigation, April 23, 2026.
- FAA, Nationwide Ground Stop: Questions and Answers, November 15, 2026.
- L3Harris, statement on November 13 ground stop, November 14, 2026.
Editorial note: This article is dated November 15, 2026 and reflects records reviewed through that date. Findings that are still preliminary are identified as such. Follow the Influence does not treat association, an overlapping policy proposal or a government contract as proof of coordination or misconduct. Corrections and updates are part of the public record.